Part 2 – Institutionalizing the Macanese Diaspora (revised)

Since 2010, as gaming dominated Macau’s economy and pressures from Beijing increased to diversify into other industries, a different kind of dynamic has begun to take shape: a search for cultural identity among the dwindling Macanese community.[1] The roots of this search can be traced back over a decade before the 1999 handover to China. Several interviews with observers and participants conducted in Macau and the United States indicate that during early negotiations in 1985 the Portuguese heads of Macau’s government, who were members of the “Maquista” majority (named for their use of the local patois) negotiated “golden parachute” deals with the Chinese government to insure an easy transition between governments in exchange for maintaining Macanese culture and the employment of local Portuguese after the handover.[2]

The rationale was to use anticipated gaming revenues to preserve the cultural history of the territory through the restoration of old buildings, ancient architectural and religious sites, historical materials, and archival media, as well as to support pet projects which the leaders would manage going forward. The former included greater involvement in the Instituto Cultural de Macau, founded in September 1982 and since renamed “The Cultural Affairs Bureau”, which became the centerpiece of a large preservation program. Since then, an historical archive and a modern central library were created in 1993, and a local museum was built in 1998. These efforts culminated in the designation of Macau’s 16th century “Historic Centre” by UNESCO in 2005 as a World Heritage Site.

The Macanese also convinced the Chinese government to retain Portuguese as one of three “official languages” (along with English and Mandarin) so that Macau’s administration would continue functioning after the transition to Chinese rule, as well as to retain the employment and pensions of Portuguese staff. The retention of Portuguese also strengthened ties to continental Portugal by maintaining local language schools and college programs previously supported by the government.

Other initiatives included the creation of benevolent, educational and research associations headed by Macanese, [3] and the formation of expatriate (international) associations called “Casas” in other countries.[4] A key organization, which works closely with government cultural institutions, is the Conselho das Communicades Macaenses. The CCM was created in 2001 to fund and advise several international associations called “Casas de Macau”. These associations are part of the CCM’s mission to cultivate relations with Macanese who migrated to other countries, and to bring them and other relatives back to Macau for tourism and potentially, for professional exchanges.

Thus the “Macanese Diaspora” was officially recognized by the Chinese government through the support of “Casas de Macau” (Houses of Macau) in several cities in which large numbers of Macanese families settled. Each association began receiving annual funding in 2002 and is governed by the CCM board of directors in Macau.

Overseeing this council is the principal funding institution, through which a percentage of gaming revenue is distributed as government subsidies, called the “Fundacao Macau”. This Macau based institution, staffed by local and mainland Chinese, distributes funds in the form of grants to local associations and annual payments to “permanent” and “non-permanent” Macau residents.[6] The foundation’s annual budget is estimated to be 1% to 3% of Macau’s gaming revenues to support activities in Macau and Portugal.[7]

Quid Pro Quo

In exchange for the institutionalization of Macau’s legacy through preservation, language, and funded associations, local Macanese leaders pledged Chinese officials their political support after the handover and their influence among the Portuguese population in Macau. They also offered to maintain and cultivate ongoing relations with international Macanese who migrated to other countries. This fit nicely with China’s emerging outreach efforts begun under Deng Xiao Ping through his “One country, Two systems” approach, continued under Hu Jin Toa from 2002 through 2012, and was later expanded by Xi Jing Ping in 2013 through an initiative called “One Belt, One Road”.[8]

Largely unreported during the 1999 handover talks, however, is an important issue that was apparently inferred by the Maquistas and understood by the Chinese, but never plainly stated in the 1985 protocols. This was a tacit understanding that external relations would continue among succeeding generations of international Macanese to explore commercial linkages to Macau, especially in the United States and in European countries where multi-national corporations were headquartered.[9] The expectation was that local Macanese associations, including the Conselho das Communicades Macaenses (CCM), would assist the new Macau government in diversifying and expanding the regional economy through international outreach programs in preparation for Beijing’s 21st century programs, including the Greater Bay Area project and the “One Belt, One Road” initiative.

Despite the apparatus and financial resources that could link locals and internationals, Macanese leaders in Macau now struggle to define their own historical legacy, while attempting to identify the community’s role in China’s current geo-political agenda. The Cultural Affairs Bureau has implemented a well-funded program to preserve a sanitized version of local history that securely ties Macau’s economy to cultural tourism, without adding future business development, as the principal alternative to gaming. This has been achieved by maintaining historical appearances through the renovation of colonial buildings and historic sites, the preservation of archives and materials, the publication of reviews and books, and investment in research institutions through regular grants.

Notably absent is shared research conducted by the Cultural Affairs Bureau that would contribute to a better understanding of Macau’s history, culture, and colonial legacy, which would be welcomed by international scholars, but is not taught in local schools.[10] In fact, a review of curricula in Macau from 2013 through 2019 found that very few courses were offered on Macau’s history in local colleges and universities.[11] Few peer-reviewed articles or books related to the subject area have been published inside Macau, nor has much historical research been presented to academic or general audiences since 2009. [12] As a result, the physical presence of local Macanese has become little more than the public face of the government’s preservation program, which offers only an outline of Macau’s significant role in world history to tourists and the general public.

The outreach component conducted by the CCM, which was intended to support China’s international programs, is also beginning to suffer. This has been the organization of “Encontros” (meetings) offered by the Conselho das Communicades Macaenses and funded by the Fundacao Macau since 2001 involving international “Casa de Macau” members, who have been encouraged to visit Macau every three years.[13] These meetings involve lavish dinners, receptions, lectures, visits to historical sites, side travel to mainland China, and stipends to Casa presidents to encourage attendance.[14] Retired expatriates, many who left Macau, Hong Kong, and Shanghai between 1945 and 1980, have been the principal targets of these nostalgic campaigns, receiving small discounts for travel and accommodations.

The most glaring error in the CCM strategy has been the Encontros’ marketing to older members and an emphasis on “reconnecting” with Macau, instead of also utilizing familial ties to leverage professional connections in other countries. The issue ironically involves an unchecked abundance of funding. The budgets for the governing Conselho, which support annual salaries, international travel, staffing, building maintenance, and logistics between Encontro meetings, have grown steadily along with Macau’s gaming revenue.[15] The target audience of the Encontros, however, seems to average over 60 years old and has gradually declined as members age, enter retirement, and travel less due to failing health.[16]

While Conselho leaders in Macau and international Casa de Macau directors enthusiastically promote the weekly long events, several admit to an inability to increase attendance by involving second and third generation members in the cultural visits.[17] There are reports among some attendees that Encontro organizers also disregard international members who seek information about regional commerce or business opportunities. This apathy is borne out by the lack of invitations to internationals working in technology companies, finance, banking, healthcare, manufacturing, higher education, pharmaceuticals, bio-tech, and venture capital, who may be interested in both cultural and commercial exchanges. Virtually no effort, moreover, has been made to involve local Macanese professionals, a target of China’s “Greater Bay Area” initiative, who speak multiple languages and are likely to be interested in these contacts. [18]

Short Term Gains vs the Bigger Picture

The inability of Macanese leaders to involve professionals in diversifying Macau’s economy suggests an unwillingness to engage the entire international community, while focusing only on a select and older demographic for short term gain.[19] As one scholar observed, the failure to utilize all cultural assets jeopardizes China’s ability to use Macau as a destination for tourism and as a gateway to commerce.[20] This may become more significant as Hong Kong, China’s other Special Administrative Region, recovers from the impacts of the “Occupy” and the “Umbrella” protests, and now the Covid-19 virus. Macau, seemingly immune to political strife and slowly emerging from the pandemic, may now be the best hope to keep at least one of the “Western Gateways” to China functioning as expected.

The indifference to business in Macau may also undermine the Macanese relationship to China in general. For as long as China looks to Macau for cultural and commercial connections, the Macanese, now under the government’s new Chief Executive, Ho Iat Seng, soon may be forced to demonstrate adherence to China’s agenda or suffer the consequences. In a worst case scenario, the inability of Macanese to learn their own history and to involve new generations in Macau’s recovery may lead to cultural marginalization, and hasten their incorporation into the Chinese mainstream.[21] After two decades since the handover, a lack of action may no longer be acceptable, and suggests that a new strategy may be necessary. [22] 

Next time: Part 3 – Where do we go from here ?

[1] According to the latest United Nations data, the Macanese community in Macau is estimated to be 11,688, or 1.8% of the total population of 649,335. Gaming in Macau currently accounts for 86% of total government revenue. “Macau Gaming Industry Responsible for 86 Percent of Enclave Government Tax Revenue”, Devin O’Connor – December 19, 2019. 

[2] The interviews were conducted by the author with former legislators, newspaper editors, association leaders, attorneys, businesspeople, and educators during research visits to Macau between 2013 and 2017. Other interviews were conducted by telephone in the United States through the end of 2019 with Casa de Macau officials who attended meetings when the protocols were discussed and signed. All of the participants in these interviews have asked to remain anonymous.

[3] The organizations in Macau include: Associacao dos Macaenses (ADM), a cultural association; The International Institute of Macau (IIM), a publishing association; APOMAC – an Association of Pensioners and Retirees of Macau, The Institute of European Studies of Macau (IEEM), a research facility; The Associação Promotora da Instrução dos Macaenses(APIM), an organization to market and promote Macau; and CEAM, an association of former and current union members from government agencies.

[4] In Macau, a distinction is often made between “Local” and “International” Macanese by the heads of associations in Macau to differentiate those who remained in Asia from those who migrated to other countries.

[5] There are currently 13 funded Casas located in the United States ( three in the San Francisco Bay Area), Canada (Richmond and Ontario), Australia (Brisbane and Melbourne), Portugal (Lisbon), Brazil (Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo), Britain (London), and Hong Kong. The total membership is estimated to be about 7,000 members. There are also at least twenty other international Macanese organizations that can be identified on social media and web sites in 35 countries that do not receive funding from Macau. Population data gathered by Portuguese scholars and independent surveys conducted by the Portuguese and Macanese Studies Project at U.C. Berkeley indicate that there may be more than 1.6 million Macanese and related Luso-Asians. Results from the surveys will be discussed in Part 3.

[6] The distinction is based on birth and long-term residency. Permanent residents are identified as those who were born in Macau or have lived and worked there for at least seven years. Non-permanent residents are expatriates who no longer live in Macau but retain citizenship through birth or ties to first or second generation family members who were residents. Each group is currently entitled to receive an annual subsidy of about $1,500 USD. A counterpart in Portugal, also called “Fundacao Macau”, was created in Lisbon to support research and scholarships through the University of Coimbra.

[7] Macau casino gaming revenue in 2019 was $36.5 Billion. If the estimates of those interviewed are accurate, the Fundacao Macau’s revenues in that year would have been between $365 million to $1.095 billion.

[8] China Daily, “Xi proposes a ‘new Silk Road’ with Central Asia”, September 8, 2013.

[9] Based on interviews with several informants, an acknowledgement was conveyed to Chinese officials to bring expatriate Macanese back to Macau periodically in order to expose them to commercial opportunities. This part of the agreement remains unfulfilled. No formal or social gatherings between local and expatriate business people have been organized by the Conselho das Communicades de Macaense since 2001.

[10] Despite the Bureau’s lack of involvement, recent scholarship conducted outside Macau continues to grow. For example, sees Arnaldo M.A. Gonçalves, “Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions: The Downfall of The “One Country, Two Systems” Policy, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 9 • No.10, USA, October 2019: 11-25;Lucio de Sousa, “The Jewish Presence in China and Japan in the Early Modern Period: A Social Representation”, in M. Perez Garcia and L. de Sousa (eds.),Global History and New Polycentric Approaches, Palgrave Studies in Comparative Global History, Tokyo, 2018:183-218; and Rui Manuel Loureiro, “Turning Japanese? The experiences and writings of a Portuguese Jesuit in 16th century Japan”, In Dejanirah Couto and Francois Lachaud (eds.), Empires eloignes: L’Europe de le Japan (XVIe-XIXe siedes) Paris, 2000:155-168

[11] During several research visits in those years, including one as a Fulbright scholar at the University of Macau in 2015, I was informed by faculty members that most government schools and universities did not offer Macau history courses to their students.

[12] An exception is The Cultural Bureau’s own “Review of Culture”, published in Portuguese and English but not widely distributed outside Macau. The University of Macau’s “Research Centre for Luso-Asian Studies”, another potential source of information, is now focused on Portuguese linguistics. RCLAS has not produced historical research since a 2009 study of 16th century Macau by Professor Isabel Lenoir da Silva de Seabra on Muitsai women (racially diverse girls sold by their parents as servants and concubines to Portuguese settlers, an important basis of Luso-Asian kinship in Macau).

[13] The meetings began in 1986 under the colonial government and continued after the handover to China in 1999.

[14] Some attendees reported that the 2019 Encontro included for the first time a large number of local Macanese who were charged admission. Macanese leaders later explained it was necessary because the Fundacao Macau had not provided enough funds to cover expenses. This seemed questionable given the large budget usually allocated for the meetings, and the declining number of international attendees.

[15] The annual budgets of the Conselho de Communicades de Macau (CCM) are not made public. Estimates by those interviewed, which have not been verified, place annual CCM grants from the Fundacao Macau at approximately $5-$6 million USD. This does not include separate funds allocated every three years for the Encontros, nor the value of real property in Macau purchased by the foundation for daily use by the Conselho. The same arrangements seem to be enjoyed by other Macanese associations as well.

[16] Although attendance data is not publicized, personal observation, news accounts, and reports from attendees indicated that participation declined from approximately 1800 in 2013, to 1250 in 2016, to “less than 1000” in 2019. As mentioned, a significant number in 2019 were suspected to be locals who paid admission.

[17] There is an awareness among leaders that the involvement of young descendants is important, and an acknowledgement that the task is difficult, without accepting responsibility for the falling numbers. As Leonel Alves, President of the General Council of the CCM stated recently: “The Macanese of the so-called new generation will be able to discover Macau as a lever for the Mainland of China and for this region of the world … .” As for the involvement of younger members, Alves observed: “I think it’s very difficult. It is not an easy task, … It is the function of the Macau Houses (the Casas) … to transmit the Macanese culture and this feeling of connection …”. Jornal Tribuna de Macau, “Meeting of Macaenses as “Roagem de Saudade”, November 22, 2019.

[18] These occurrences were considered “common practice” by international Macanese who regularly attend the meetings, and asked questions during tours and at cultural events in Macau.

[19] In 2016, as Beijing again ordered “adequate diversification” of Macau’s economy, a leading newspaper warned of an economic recession. “Recessao Ainda em 2016 e 2017?”, Jan. 8, 2016, Jornal Tribuna de Macau. This prediction became a reality in 2020. Casino revenue was down over 80%.

[20] According to Hilary du Cros, “Cultural heritage tourism” and an accurate portrayal of Macau’s history to visitors. provides an advantage over competitors like Las Vegas and Singapore. Hilary du Cros, “Emerging Issues for Cultural Tourism in Macau”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 1/2009: 73-99.

[21] Antonio Jose’ de Freitas, the director of a large association, suggested in an interview in the Macau newspaper Jornal Tribuna de Macau on Feb. 26, 2016, there is concern that because Macanese history is not taught in local schools, Macanese identity is in danger of evaporating over time.

[22] Local scholars are aware of the problem and the possible solution. Professor George Wei, Director of the Department of History at the University of Macau, commented on a general lack of professionalism in Macau, and suggested that the skill of Macanese traders in 19th century Macau and neighboring Zhuhai to connect diverse partners in a new global economy provides a model for the future. Hoje Macau, Front Page, Dec. 7, 2015.